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DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLE GENERATION: THE TRIFECTA
OF ENERGY SOLUTIONS TO CURB CARBON
EMISSIONS, REDUCE POLLUTANTS, AND
EMPOWER RATEPAYERS
SHANNON BAKER-BRANSTETTER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Averting the disastrous consequences of global climate change
will require the United States, and the world, to radically restructure its electricity generation and delivery system.' Currently, the
combustion of fossil fuels constitutes 73% of electricity generation
in the United States.2 Electricity generation accounts for 34% of
U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and cost American consumers and businesses $344 billion in 2007.3 While reducing GHG
* Shannon Baker-Branstetter serves as policy counsel for Consumers Union
and is a member of the California Bar. She earned her undergraduate degree
from Yale University, Master's in Public Policy from the University of California,
Los Angeles, and J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. The author would
like to thank Jonathan Weisgall and Robert Huffman for sharing their rich knowledge of energy policy and providing helpful guidance on this article. This article
reflects solely the viewpoint of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official position of Consumers Union.
1. Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, & Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapterl.html (last visited Jan. 26,
2011) [hereinafter Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, & Energy] (discussing electrical generation and contribution to climate change).
2. Electricity Overview, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.

pewclimate.org/technology/overview/electricity (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (citing
high level of electricity generated by fossil fuels).
3. See id. (providing statistics related to U.S. electricity generation); see also
Jason Alexander et al., An Overview of Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Emissions
Reduction Scenariosfor the Future,EUR. PARLIAMENT POL'Y DEPARTMENT: ECON. & SCI.
POL'v, 9 (Feb. 2008), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/
studies/download.do?file=19411 (noting that global electricity generation accounts for approximately same proportion of global GHG emissions); Electric Power
Annual 2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epaxlfileesl.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (noting cost of electricity generation to American consumers).

(1)
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emissions to safe levels will require many policy changes, one essential component is the expansion of clean, renewable sources of energy to replace fossil fuel energy sources presently used for
electricity production.4
In the United States, and throughout the world, electric transmission lines do not currently have sufficient capacity to accommodate a vast expansion and distribution of renewable energy.5
Increasing transmission infrastructure, while necessary, should be
minimized for aesthetic, economic, and environmental reasons.6
Transmission lines are expensive to build, and procuring right-ofways can be time-consuming and costly.7 In addition, the lines
often bisect ecosystems, disrupt wildlife migrations, and destroy the
natural beauty of wilderness areas.8 Many of the best renewable energy sources reside in the most scenic and ecologically important
places in the United States, such as the Mojave Desert.9
If developing renewable resources is essential for saving ecosystems from damage caused by GHG emissions, but the transmission
lines required for transporting the electricity from renewable
sources also damage ecosystems, are we faced with a choice between
the lesser of two evils?' 0 One elegant solution to the transmission
problem is distributed renewable generation (DRG)." DRG is the
generation of electricity on-site or near the location where the electricity is consumed.' 2 Examples of DRG include solar photovoltaic
4. Renewable Energy, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.eere.energy.gov/
topics/renewable-energy.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (listing various forms of
renewable energy).
5. Norma Love, Transmission Limits Hamper Renewable Energy Plans, USA ToDAY, Mar. 9, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2008-0309-renewableenergy_N.htm (discussing insufficient transmission lines for renewable energy expansion).
6. Id. (explaining how individuals want renewable energy plants far from their
residences).
7. Id. (describing time-consuming process of receiving approval for renewable
energy plants and transmission lines in addition to expenses).
8. Id. (identifying necessity of placing renewable energy plants far from civilization and consequential need for transmission lines to bring power to homes).
9. Ina Jaffe, A Renewable Energy Debate Heats up in the Mojave, NPR, Apr. 23,
2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126173547 (discussing prevalence of renewable energy sources in Mojave Desert).
10. See Love, supra note 5 (reporting conflict between saving environment
through renewable energy and need for transmission lines traversing areas away
from civilization).
11. Distributed Renewable Generation, STANDARD RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://
www.sre3.com/knowledgeCenter.do?pageld=knowledgecenterdistributedrenew
ablegeneration (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter DistributedRenewable Generation] (providing definition of DRG).
12. Id. (explaining concept of DRG).
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cells on rooftops; methane capture and conversion at livestock facilities; and locally produced, small-scale wind and geothermal energy
capture.13

Because the electricity is consumed where it is generated,
transmission lines to accommodate DRG either are already in place
or need only cover short distances.1 4 Transmission and distribution
lines still need to be upgraded with superior communication and
feedback technologies to accommodate DRG, but these upgrades
do not require more space.15 Given the almost unfathomable scaling of renewables necessary to make deep cuts to GHG emissions,
some transmission lines will still be necessary to solve the spatial
mismatch between the location of renewable resources and the location of electricity demand, but DRG has the potential to dramatically reduce the number and length of new transmission lines
needed for the renewable energy revolution.16 Notably, DRG minimizes the need for additional transmission infrastructure and
siting.1 7
The benefits of DRG extend far beyond reducing the need for
new transmission lines.18 Additional benefits include cost savings
for electricity consumers; back-up or supplementary power that
reduces the need for more power plants; and decreases in energy
loss from long-range transmission.1 9 The following paper describes
the reasons why more renewable generation is necessary; assesses
federal and state policies for encouraging DRG; makes recommendations to reach environmental goals and benefit residential ratepayers; and addresses utilities' concerns about expanding DRG. 20
13. Renewable Energy Production Incentive, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www
.epa.gov/lmop/publications-tools/funding-guide/federal-resources/energy.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (listing sources of renewable energy).
14. See DistributedRenewable Generation,supra note 11 (offering benefits of DRG
in relation to transmission lines).
15. Id. (discussing technological improvements).
16. Id. (discussing overall reduction of transmission lines due to location of
DRG).
17. See Renewable Distributed Distribution Energy Collaborative, CAL. PUB. UTIL.
(last
COMM'N,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/Re-DEC.htm
visited Jan. 27, 2011) (explaining usefulness of DRG in minimizing transmission
infrastructure). The California Public Utilities Commission estimates that to reach
a 33% renewable portfolio standard (RPS), the high distributed generation scenario minimizes the need for new transmission while adding 15,000 megawatts (MW)
of distributed solar photovoltaic. Id.
18. See DistributedRenewable Generation, supra note 11 (discussing overall reduction of transmission lines due to DRG location).
19. Id. (relating various benefits of DRG).
20. For a discussion of reasons why more renewable generation is necessary,
see infra Section II. For an assessment of federal and state policies regarding DRG,
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"BUSINESS AS USUAL" WILL DESTROY LIVING AS USUAL

Human-driven change to the global climate presents one of
the greatest challenges and risks facing the world today.2 1 Two degrees Celsius is the maximum temperature increase the planet can
tolerate before the consequences for humans and the environment
will become calamitous and irreversible. 22 Reducing GHG emissions by 50-85% by 2050 will likely stabilize GHG atmospheric concentrations and limit global temperature increases to two degrees
Celsius. 2 3 Polluting industries argue that the data are too uncertain
and the solution too expensive to pursue, but this argument undervalues the cost of inaction. 24 The narrow band of uncertainty in the
data and projections varies only by how dire the consequences will
be, not whether they will occur.25 Furthermore, the costs to restructure the economy, mitigate damage from climate change, and
adapt to a changed environment will only rise in the future. 26
Known or likely consequences of climate change, such as decreased crop production; decreased fresh water supplies; damaged
coastlines; extreme flood and fire damage; and harms to ecosystems
and human health, are observable and will become increasingly expensive to address. 27 There is also the possibility of unknown consequences caused by unidentified reverberations and feedback
mechanisms that may make climate change even worse than pre-

see infta Sections III, IV, and V. For a rebuttal of utilities' concerns about DRG
expansion, see infra Section VI. For recommendations on reaching environmental
goals and benefiting residential ratepayers, see infra Section VII.
21. See Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, & Energy, supra note 1 (discussing
power generation and contribution to climate change).
22. See Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CUMATE CHANGE, 51, 53-54, 67 (Nov. 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report] (revealing global consequences of slight temperature increases).
23. Id. (noting effects of reduction in GHG emissions on global temperature).
This calculation could be optimistic or overstated, but it is the best scientific estimate currently available. Id.
24. Anne Minard, Global Warming Inaction More Costly Than Solutions?, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC NEws, Sept. 24, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2007/09/070924-global-warrning.html (arguing that regardless of whether global
warming is real, preemptive measures should be taken).
25. See Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, supra note 22 (acknowledging uncertainties in findings).
26. See Minard, supra note 24 (describing potential effects of climate change).
27. Global Warming Effects Map, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc, http://environment.
nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/gw-impacts-interactive/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (delineating consequences of climate change
worldwide).
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dicted. 2 8 An ounce of prevention may have been worth a pound of
the cure decades ago, but because "the data are too uncertain" arguments previously prevailed, now the costs of shifting our economy are only dwarfed by the rising costs of doing nothing-for
every year we delay, the costs will continue to climb.29 The energy
choices already made are too expensive, the status quo too harmful,
and the real risks too high for business as usual to continue.3 0
For example, coal extraction and coal-fired power plants have
tremendous consequences beyond carbon emissions.3 1 The National Academy of Sciences estimated that the damage to human
health, crops, forestry, and recreation from SO 2 , NOx, and particulate matter from coal-generated electricity cost society $62 billion in
2005.32 Coal-fired power plants, which have caused increased incidence of asthma and other respiratory illnesses, account for most of
these costs. 3 3 Such estimates do not even include damage from pollutants other than S02, NOx, and particulate matter emitted during
coal extraction and generation, nor do the estimates account for
the external costs of coal mining and extraction. 34 For instance,
coal plants spew lead and mercury into the ambient air and water
bodies.35 Moreover, most of the solid waste created by coal plants,
including ash and sludge from the smokestack scrubber, is disposed
of in unlined, unmonitored onsite landfills.3 6 This solid waste contains many toxic substances, including arsenic, mercury, chromium,
lead, and cadmium, which have contaminated drinking water sup28. See Minard, supra note 24 (explaining how scientists are still studying effects of global warming).
29. Id. (discussing costs of delay).
30. Id. (emphasizing urgency of situation).

31. NATIONAL RESFARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL,
AND OTHER ExTERNAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use 4-7
(The National Academies Press 2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL]
(discussing consequences from coal power plants aside from carbon emissions).
32. See id. at 6-7 (estimating damages and costs of coal-generated electricity).
33. Id. at 5 (discussing sources of cost increases).
34. Id. at 6, 78 (mentioning harmful consequences of coal-generated electricity excluded from societal cost estimates).
35. Steven Gilbert, Coal Ash: Truly Hazardous, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 18,
2010, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/50680917-82/coal-ash-epa-waste.html

.csp (discussing hazardous compounds in coal ash).
36. The Costs of Coal, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs, http://www.ucsusa
.org/clean-energy/technology-and-impacts/impacts/the-costs-of-coal.html
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2011) (depicting coal-generated electricity's effect on global warming); see also EnvironmentalImpacts of Coal Power: Wastes Generated, UNION OF CONSCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/cleanenergy/coalvswind/c02d.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Environmental Impacts of Coal Power] (exCERNED

plaining coal plant waste disposal processes).
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plies and caused damage to human organs and nervous systems,
greatly increasing cancer risks."
The enormous damage to ecosystems from mountaintop mining and coal extraction compounds the high, externalized costs of
coal.38 Even if carbon capture and sequestration materialize on a
grand scale, there is still no such thing as "clean coal."39 Even if
reducing pollution from other sectors of the economy could wholly
address climate change, burning coal to produce electricity would
still be a costly and undesirable option. 40 Thus, transitioning towards renewable, cleaner sources of electricity will provide greater
energy security, energy price stabilization, and decreased air and
water pollution, in addition to mitigating current and future harms
from climate change.4 '
Siting renewables still draws some resistance due to concerns
related to aesthetic taste, noise pollution, and wildlife preservation. 42 Renewable resources also are not technically carbon-free for
their full lifecycles because manufacturing renewable energy equipment, such as solar panels, wind turbines, and geothermal pumps,
is energy-intensive. 43 The negative attributes of renewable power
generation, however, still pale in comparison to the detriments of
traditional fossil fuel combustion.44 Although distributed generation presents some challenges, DRG provides the benefits of renewable resources, can be easier and cheaper to site, and has a lower

37. See Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water
.html (suggesting various human health risks from toxic waste); see also Environmental Impacts of Coal Power, supra note 36 (illuminating various ill-effects of waste to
human health).
38. David A. Fahrenthold, Scientists Say Mountaintop Mining Should Be Stopped,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/01/07/AR2010010702530.html (discussing additional environmental impacts from coal mining).
39. Bryan Walsh, Exposing the Myth of Clean Coal Power, TIME, Jan. 10, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1870599,00.html (arguing that
there is no such thing as clean coal).
40. Id. (discussing expense and other problems associated with coal usage).
41. See Distributed Renewable Generation, supra note 11 (offering benefits of renewable energy).
42. See Love, supra note 5 (discussing reasons for opposition to renewable energy siting).
43. World Res. Inst., Wat is a Carbon Footprint?,SAFECLIMATE.NET, http://www
.safeclimate.net/calculator/whatis-cf.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (explaining
concept of carbon footprint).
44. See Minard, supra note 24 (discussing how taking steps now towards stemming global warming can go long way).
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carbon footprint for installation and operation than concentrated
renewable generation, such as large solar or wind farms.45
The status quo for electricity production is a zero sum gamerevenues to polluting industries come at the expense of downwind
and downstream public health.4 6 Restructuring the economy towards a greater reliance on renewable resources will still power the
economy and provide revenue to new industries, while also protecting the public, the environment, and the planet as we know it.47 If
consumers of non-renewable energy could become producers of renewable energy, this transformation would dramatically hasten the
transition to clean energy. 48 DRG provides the vehicle to drive this
bargain. 49
III.

NET METERING PROVIDES A SIGNIFICANT INCENTIVE FOR SMALL-

SCALE DRG

Most electricity customers need incentives or financing to install renewable generation at their homes or businesses due to large
upfront capital costs. 50 Under a net metering policy, utilities provide credit, or cash payment under "net billing," to a customer-generator for any electricity produced in excess of consumption.5 1
Most state statutes define a net-metered system as "intended to offset part or all of the customer-generator's electricity requirements." 5 2 Net metering policies vary, but a common example
would be that of a residential ratepayer who generates 120 kilowatthours (kWh) in a month, but only uses 100 kWh.5 3 In this case, the
45. See Distributed Renewable Generation, supra note 11 (offering benefits of
DRG).

46. See Minard, supra note 24 (relating economic and environmental reasons
for taking action).
47. See Distributed Renewable Generation, supra note 11 (describing benefits of
renewable energy).
48. See Minard, supra note 24 (discussing advantages of consumers becoming
renewable energy producers).
49. See Distributed Renewable Generation,supra note 11 (noting DRG's potential
role in societal transition to clean energy).
50. Matthew L. Wald, Cost Works Against Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources
in Time of Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/
29/business/energy-environment/29renew.html (identifying expense of renewable energy technology).
GUIDE, http://www.thesolarguide.com/energy51. Net Metering, THE SovtL
intro/net-metering.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Net Metering] (explaining how net metering works).
52. Incentives/Policiesfor Renewables & Efficiency, Database of State Incentives
for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/index.cfm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2011) (describing intent of state statutes regarding net metering).
53. Id. (listing different state statutes providing for net metering).
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meter would run backwards, and the utility would credit the ratepayer 20 kWh usable on a future billing cycle until the end of the
year, at which time any unused credits would expire. 5 4 Under some
programs, the ratepayer would receive a cash payment for the excess credits at the end of the year.55 While some states mandate net
metering, others ban the practice entirely, and a host of policies
exist in between these two extremes.56
Net metering is one of the most important incentives for electricity consumers to install DRG.5 7 Increasing adoption of DRG
through well-crafted net metering programs will accomplish many
policy goals simultaneously.5 8 The primary benefits include lowering electric bills; decreasing transmission and distribution costs; decreasing the need for new transmission capital; bringing renewable
sources on-grid quickly; reducing environmental impacts of concentrated energy infrastructure; conserving water; and decreasing
GHG emissions.5 9
Net metering is a key driver of solar installation in particular.6 0
As shown by the graphs below, most of the solar photovoltaic (PV)
installations in the United States are non-residential systems connected to the grid, although residential systems outpower utility-run
solar farms. 6 1 While non-residential systems produced more power
than residential systems because the former are much larger, residential systems account for 90% of the number of installations in
recent years. 62

54. See Net Metering, supra note 51 (providing example of how to reach net bill
or value).
55. Id. (explaining how some net metering programs actually pay customergenerators for excess credits).
56. See Net Metering Map, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFiciENcy, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/NetMetering.
map.ppt#256 (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (depicting diverse net metering policies
nationwide).
57. See Wald, supra note 50 (discussing expense of renewable energy).
58. See Distributed Renewable Generation, supra note 11 (explaining policy goals
achievable through greater DRG prevalence).
59. Id. (listing primary benefits of DRG adoptions).
60. See Net Metering, supra note 51 (noting benefits of net metering).
61. 2009 Updates and Trends, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, 11-12
(Oct. 26, 2009), http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/IREC-2009Annual-ReportFinal.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Updates and Trends] (showing various
non-residential PV systems).
62. Id. at 15 (qualifying relationship between residential and non-residential
systems).
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The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) supports expanding DRG and notes numerous public
benefits. These benefits include cost control; improvements to the
efficiency and reliability of the distribution system; increased competition in transmission and distribution-constrained regions; reduced total electric generation costs; enhanced customer choice;
increased output from sunk costs such as transmission and distribution equipment; environmental benefits; and increased speed of
new power production.6 3 Benefits of DRG for all stakeholders include peak demand reduction and reduced transmission and distri63. Garry Brown, Chairman, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Testimony before
U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Energy: Net Metering, Interconnection Standards, and
Distributed Generation 3 (May 7, 2009), available at http://energy.senate.gov/
public/_files/090505NARUCBrownTestimonyFINAL.doc [hereinafter Brown Testimony] (listing public benefits of distributed generation applications and
technologies).
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bution line loads and losses. 64 NARUC also recognizes that net
metering provides "a direct, inexpensive, and easily-administered
mechanism for encouraging the customer installation of small-scale
renewable energy facilities." 65 Net metering reimburses customergenerators for the value of all or most of the power produced without the huge expense of batteries for storage. 66 Accordingly,
NARUC has worked with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and individual state public utility commissions (PUCs)
to improve interconnection standards and remove barriers to entry
for DRG, with significant success in the past few years.6 7
Commercial and industrial user benefits from DRG and net
metering are potentially even greater than benefits for residential
consumers. In North Carolina, for example, biomass from animal
waste and landfills are plentiful sources of renewable energy due to
the state's large number of hog farms and other livestock industries. North Carolina tried launching a "Swine Farm Methane Capture Pilot Program" that was set to bring forty-eight farms online to
produce electricity in 2010, but no projects are yet up and running
due to the economic downturn and insufficient resources.6 8 Despite such setbacks, the potential payoffs of methane capture are
enormous, particularly for North Carolina.6 9 For one, some experts predict methane capture will become cheaper than new coal
or nuclear plants. 70 Furthermore, rate and energy security benefits

64. Id. (discussing technological and economic benefits to electricity system).
65. Id. at 5 (describing incentives provided by net metering).
66. Christopher Cook, Managing Director, Sunworks, LLC, Testimony before
U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Energy: Net Metering and Interconnection Standards 2
(May 7, 2009), available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/ChrisCook
Testimony.pdf (hereinafter Cook Testimony] (discussing options when excess energy is produced).
67. Brown Testimony, supra note 63, at 3-4 (discussing progress made following implementation of interconnection standards).
68. Methane Capture Pilot Program,N.C. DIvisION OF SOIL & WATER CONSERVA(last visTION, http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/swc/methanecapturepilotprogram
ited Feb. 9, 2011) (noting that farm methane projects are not yet online); see also
Report to the Environmental Review Commission andjoint Legislative Utility Review Committee January 2010, N.C. UTIL. COMMIssION, 3 (Jan. 2010), http://www.ncuc.
commerce.state.nc.us/reports/MCPPJointReport.2010.pdf (identifying reasons
for setbacks in farm methane program).
69. Alex Hobbs, Presentation before Environmental and Economic Benefits
of Capturing Swine Manure Methane Workshop: NC Distributed Generation Interconnection and Net Metering 6 (Sept. 18, 2008), availableat http://www.epa.gov/
agstar/documents/workshop08-1/hobbs.pdf (hereinafter Hobbs Presentation]
(discussing economic impact of methane capture).
70. Id. (discussing rate impact estimate).
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will remain in state and strengthen rural communities.7 1 Importantly, methane capture will also help mitigate pollution from the
hog and poultry industries, improve air and water quality, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by millions of tons per year.72
Combined heat and power (CHP) plants are a variation of distributed generation that reduces GHGs and energy use by capturing and reusing energy from heat that would otherwise be lost.7 3
Because industries using CHP are likely to still need energy from
the grid, favorable interconnection standards and net metering policies are critical incentives for CHP retrofits and adoption.74 The
variety of potential sources makes CHP an attractive form of distributed generation. The U.S. Department of Energy has supported
over 350 CHP projects, including locations such as farms, prisons,
residential developments, schools, industrial plants, and commercial buildings.75
Net metering policies that favor DRG also provide benefits to
government policy makers and regulators. Many state and local
governments, especially in the Colorado River Basin, suffer from
large-scale water shortages and face permitting fights for power
generation and transmission.7 6 DRG mitigates the need for governments to take on either of these thorny issues.77 DRG reduces the
need for new transmission lines by generating power where it is
consumed and connecting to existing infrastructure. Coal and nuclear plants and many large-scale renewable plants consume huge
amounts of water as part of their operation.78 In contrast, the most
likely candidates for DRG are solar PV, wind, and geothermal
71. See generally Hobbs, supra note 69 (discussing economic impact of methane capture).
72. Id. (noting environmental impact of methane capture).
73. Combined Heat and Power (CHP), GREENPEACE UK, http://www.greenpeace.
(last visited Jan. 27,
org.uk/climate/solutions/combined-heat-and-power-chp
2011) (discussing efficiency of combined heat and power plants).
74. Cook Testimony, supra note 66, at 8-9 (discussing growing need for interconnection rules).
75. Combined Heat and Power Projects, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://
wwwl.eere.energy.gov/industry/distributedenergy/chp-projects.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2011) (identifying Department of Energy-sponsored projects).
76. Todd Woody, Alternative Energy Projects Stumble on a Need for Water, N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/business/energyenvironment/30water.html?_r=1 (identifying public divide over water shortages
and government involvement).
77. Id. (discussing water efficiency of various technologies).
78. Woody, supranote 76 (summarizing water usage at various forms of power
plants). Concentrated solar projects, biofuel refineries, coal scrubbers, coal plant
cooling operations, solar thermal (with wet cooling), and nuclear plants are all
water-intensive technologies. Id.
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power, which require relatively small amounts of water.7 9 Thus,
DRG reduces the strain on overtaxed water supplies compared with

other sources of power.
IV.

THE CURRENT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR
GREATLY By STATE

DRG

VARIES

In 2007, for the first time, new renewable (non-hydro) capacity
outpaced new fossil fuel capacity.8 0 The federal government has
become increasingly receptive to calls for renewable generation,
and new policies favor its development.8 1 DRG facilities usually fall
outside of FERC jurisdiction, however, because FERC does not generally cover local distribution facilities.8 2 Federal law, through the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), requires utilities to
allow any independent power producer that is a "qualified facility"

(QF) to be interconnected with the grid, and utilities must
purchase any excess electricity QFs generate. 3 Individual customers are not considered QFs under PURPA.8 4 Through net metering
programs, however, many states have required utilities to accept
power from small-scale residential, community, or commercial customer-generator systems, such as wind and solar PV, and credit this
power against the customer-generator's utility bill.8 5
Net metering rules are generally subject to state or local jurisdiction unless the generator sells electricity on the wholesale market, which triggers FERC jurisdiction.8 6 FERC considers a
transaction "wholesale" if the generator produces more energy than
79. Id. (discussing less efficient technologies which use less water); see also Electric Power Annual, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/electricity/epa/epa-sum.html [hereinafter Electric Power Annual] (describing different types of DRG technologies).
80. Electric Power Annual, supra note 79 (describing current trends in energy
usage).
81. Energy Efficiency, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov/energy
efficiency/index.htm (last visitedJan. 27, 2011) (explaining Department's commitment to renewable energy and energy efficiency).
82. Kevin A. Kelly, Director, Div. of Policy Dev., Office of Energy Policy &
Innovation, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Testimony before U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Energy 1, 4 (May 7, 2009), available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/
files/KevinKellyTestimonyFinal.pdf [hereinafter Kelly Testimony] (explaining
how FERC interpreted FPA to limit number of local distribution facilities that
could obtain generator interconnections).
83. Id. at 7 (describing qualified facility interconnections system).
84. What is a Qualifying Facility?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N., http://www.ferc.
gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2011)
(defining qualifying facilities).
85. Kelly Testimony, supra note 82, at 5-6 (discussing state requirements imposed through net metering programs).
86. Id. at 5 (describing jurisdictional issues surrounding net metering).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol22/iss1/1

12

Baker-Branstetter: Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta of Energy Solution

2011]

DISTRIBUTED RENEwABLE GENERATION

13

it needs and sells excess energy to a utility over the applicable billing period.8 7 For generators who make net sales on the wholesale
market, the generator must comply with Federal Power Act (FPA)
requirements for wholesalers, unless it is a QF under PURPA." If a
generator qualifies as a QF, it must follow the requirements of
PURPA. 89 If an electric utility purchases a QF's total output, the
terms of interconnection are within state authority. On the other
hand, if a QF reserves the right to sell or sells any of the QF's output
to an additional entity, FERC exercises authority over the rates,
terms, and conditions of the QF's interconnection. 90 Net metering
customers using distributed generation must seek to connect to distribution lines (generally outside of FERC jurisdiction) and must
apply to the state public utility commission or the local utility.Y
Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have net metering policies in place, the most recent of which is Alaska. 92 Many of
these state laws address the treatment of net excess generation and
renewable energy credit (REC) ownership of community- and thirdparty-owned DRG systems. 9 3 Some states require utilities to pay individual customer-producers at market retail rate for the excess
power they produce. By purchasing excess electricity production
and providing backup power for customers' DRG systems, customer-generators are able to use the electric grid as a battery that
stores excess capacity.
States are free to institute net metering policies independent
of PURPA's QF regime and "avoided cost" price mandate for selling
electricity back to the grid. California's net metering law, for example, does not refer to PURPA and independently establishes customer-generators as a new class of customers eligible for net
metering, regardless of PURPA's requirements. 94 New York and
87. Id. at 5-6 (discussing precedent set by FERC's decision in MidAmerican
Energy Co., 94 FERC 1 61,340 at 62,263 (2001)).
88. Id. at 6 (distinguishing between FPA and PURPA coverage).
89. Id. (stating that PURPA governs qualified facilities).
90. Kelly Testimony, supra note 82, at 7 (discussing federal regulations' preemption of state laws when qualified facilities are involved).
91. See id. at 6 (noting that Department of Energy defines "distributed generation" as "electric generation feeding into the distribution grid instead of the transmission grid").
92. 2010 Updates & Trends, INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, 8 (Oct.
11, 2010), http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/IREC-AnnualTrends-Report-10-1-10_web.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Updates & Trends] (setting forth
national net metering trends).
93. Id. (noting elements of existing state net metering policies)
94. See generally Cal. Pub. Util. Code. § 2827 (West 2011) (evidencing states'
ability to avoid PUPRA requirements).
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many western states, including California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, all enacted net metering legislatively. 95
Other states have enacted net metering by regulatory commission.
Even if a state enacts net metering under PURPA, no money
changes hands between customer-generators when the utility issues
customers "credits" for excess generation beyond their usage. This
non-monetary exchange of electricity does not implicate PURPA's
"avoided cost" mandate, so states have flexibility to determine the
rate at which utilities must reimburse consumers for net excess
generation.
Most states have a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), and
state policies vary on the interplay among the RPS, distributed generation, and net metering. The most favorable policy towards DRG
would require utilities to meet a high RPS (20% +); give utilities
extra credit for DRG towards meeting its RPS; require utilities to
pay the retail rate for excess electricity delivered through net metering; and develop consumer-friendly education and financing to
adopt DRG. No state has all four of these policy incentives, but
many states, nonetheless, have strong enough incentives to encourage rapid deployment of DRG. Washington, Virginia, Utah,
and Delaware offer increased credit towards RPS mandates for solar
or customer-sited renewable energy.9 6 A few states, however, such
as Alabama, still allow electric utilities to impose exit fees on industrial customers who transition to generating their own power, which
actively discourages DRG and CHP.97
Nearly all states impose caps on DRG as a percentage of a utility's total sales. Under a cap, a utility need not bring additional
DRG on-grid if it already accepts power from customers in a designated proportion to the cap. As DRG becomes more popular, some
states, such as California, are running up against the cap.9 8 In or95. Nelson P. Holmberg, Distributed GenerationGives Utilities Reason to Consider
Net Metering, TRunsmissIoN & DisrRIBUTION WORLD (June 30, 2004), http://
tdworld.com/news/distributed-generation-net-metering (listing states that have
opted for legislative implementation of net metering).
96. See Freeingthe Grid, NETWORK FOR NEW ENERGY CHOICES, 94-99 (Oct. 2008),
http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/FreeingTheGrid2008_report.pdf
[hereinafter Freeingthe Grid] (detailing state incentives for customer-generated renewable energy).
97. Irene Kowalczyk, Director of Energy Policy & Supply, MeadWestvaco
Corp., Testimony before U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Energy 8 (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.ieca-us.com/documents/MWVIECACHPWrittenTestimonyMay
72009Senate.pdf [hereinafter Kowalczyk Testimony] (discussing state policies that
discourage self-generating).
98. Jennifer Kho, Solar Showdown Looms in California, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG
(June 9, 2009, 1:17 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/solar-
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der to prevent a solar installation slow-down, California negotiated
that Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) temporarily increase its DRG
cap 1% above the current 2.5% limit until new legislation raises the
cap.9 9 Ohio recently removed its 1% cap, thus requiring utilities to
accept any new qualified DRG from customers. 10 0 Meanwhile, New
York caps the amount of DRG that utilities must accept at 1.3% of
each utility's peak load.10 1 Opponents to increasing DRG caps argue that more net metering could reduce the stability of the grid
and raise costs for other customers who are not generating their
own power.10 2 Section VI, infra, addresses this concern.
Reimbursement policies for net excess generation vary. New
York requires utilities to credit residential and farm customers for
all excess generation during a twelve-month period at the market or
wholesale rate.1 03 Similarly, Ohio's four major electric utilities are
required to refund customer-generators for any remaining credits
at the end of the year.104 Some states leave reimbursement rates up
to the utility or do not require reimbursement at all beyond the
non-monetary credits provided during a twelve-month billing cycle.
Several publicly-owned utilities strongly encourage DRG. For
example, two utilities in Washington state, Clark Public Utilities and
Snohomish County PUD, buy excess electricity from DRG at the full
retail rate. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) also buys
solar power from its customers at the full retail rate. 105 SMUD's
"PV Pioneer Program" was an early leader in net metering, installing nearly 600 systems on customers' roofs. Under the innovative
program that began in 1993, SMUD purchased, installed, owned,
and operated 2 to 4 kilowatt (kW) solar PV systems on volunteer
showdown-looms-in-california (reporting concerns that give rise as DRG practices
expand).
99. PG&E Net Metering Cap to be Raised, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD.COM (Oct.
29, 2009), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/10/
pg-e-net-metering-cap-to-be-raised (discussing California's method for increasing
cap requirements).
100. See Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, Consumers'FactSheet: Renewable Energy Sources Net Metering 2 (2010), http://www.pickocc.org/publications/
renewable-energy/NetMeteringBasics.pdf [hereinafter Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel] (discussing Ohio's method for avoiding cap requirements).
101. See Brown Testimony, supra note 63, at 7 (summarizing New York's capping procedure).
102. See Kho, supra note 98 (illuminating counterarguments to increasing
cap).
103. See Brown Testimony, supra note 63, at 7 (describing utility generation
credits for residential and farm customers).
104. See Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, supra note 100, at 2 (mentioning Ohio customer-generators' credit refund).
105. See Holmberg, supra note 95 (detailing SMUD system of refund).
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customers' roofs. Today, SMUD customers purchase their own PV
systems and reap the savings themselves, taking advantage of
SMUD's volume purchases, which reduces customers' costs.
V.

SEVERAL REGULATORY BARRIERS REMAIN

Although forty-three states and D.C. have a net metering policy
in place, these policies vary widely in their effectiveness. In its annual report, the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC) rates
only thirteen states as an "A," with the rest needing varying levels of
improvement. 106 Common barriers include small system size limits,
tight caps on aggregate capacity, inadequate payment to customergenerators, poor interconnection standards, and net metering
bans. 0 7
NET METERING GRADES PER "FREEING THE GRID

2009"

WWW.NEWENERGYCHOICES.ORG

.B-VT,
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In the spring of 2009, the Texas Legislature introduced HB
1243, which would have provided a minimum repayment for net
metering of at least 80% of the retail price. While this reimbursement level is much less generous than many states, it was still too
great a lift to overcome utility resistance. 0 8 The Association of
Electric Companies of Texas urged the Texas Legislature to adopt a
106. See 2009 Updates and Trends, supra note 61, at 24-25 (stating that 2010
grades have not been finalized as of October 18, 2010).
107. Id. (listing common barriers to effectiveness of net metering policies).
108. See Go Solar: Make Utilities Give Consumers a FairPicefor Surplus Electricity,
ENv'T TEX. BLOG (May 9, 2009, 3:08 PM), http://www.environmenttexas.org/
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net billing model under which customers would pay for transmission and distribution costs of all the power they took off the grid,
even if they offset some of that usage, and utility companies would
compensate customers at full market value for their surplus
power.10 9 TXU and Reliant, two investor-owned utilities, also urged
the legislature to adopt amendments that would have credited customer-generated electricity at wholesale rates and limited the size
and scope of net metering to 10 kW residential systems (excluding
school, community, retail, and commercial systems). Texas ended
up forgoing any legislation on net metering in 2009.
In contrast to Texas, Massachusetts recently extended reimbursement at retail rates to customer-generators with projects up to
two megawatts.' 1 0 Previously, customer-generators in Massachusetts
could only sell excess power at wholesale rates for projects up to 60
kW. In addition, Massachusetts extended coverage under its net
metering program to town and state facilities. Massachusetts's program expansion reflects overall trends of state net metering policies
over the last few years.
State policies continue to evolve in this area, mostly towards
more favorable net metering policies and interconnection standards, but there is still a long way to go before building DRG is
economically viable throughout the country.1 11 State or utility-level
barriers to DRG often include burdensome interconnection requirements that result in the unfair treatment of non-utility distributed generation, bundled distribution service tariffs, additional
fees, and ambiguous jurisdictional authority.' 1 2 While directly addressing such barriers should be a priority as well, strong net meter-

ing policies strengthen DRG's position as a worthwhile investment
for residential, commercial, and industrial electricity consumers.
Uncertainty in reimbursement, restrictions on system size, and administrative burdens and fees undermine efforts to increase DRG.
blog/home/go-solar-make-utilities-give-consumers-a-fair-price-for-surplus-electri
city (discussing resistance to HB 1243 by electric companies TXU and Reliant).
109. See Net Metering as Basis for Surplus Power Compensation, Ass'N OF ELEcric
COMPANIES OF TEX., INC. (Mar. 2009), http://www.aect.net/documents/2009/
20090323 81-HB1643_NetMetering.pdf (recommending adoption of new net billing model for Texas).
110. See Steve LeBlanc, Mass. Homeowners Can Now Sell Back Electricity, SEATrLE
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/business
(contrasting
technology/2010391471 apusrenewableenergymassachusetts.html
Texas and Massachusetts retail rates).
111. See generally 2010 Updates & Trends, supranote 92 (highlighting progress
made in various states).
112. Brown Testimony, supra note 63, at 4 (describing unfairness of state and
utility-level barriers to DRG).
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ADDRESSING STAKEHOLDERS' CONCERNS

Despite the benefits of DRG and net metering expressed in
Section II, supra, some states still resist both. This resistance is due
in large part to investor-owned utilities' (IOUs) fears of losing revenues from net metering policies. In order to move forward, various
policy adjustments may garner IOUs' favor, or at least neutrality. In
addition, there is concern that allowing net metering will favor customer-generators to the detriment of other customer classes. Addressing this concern is important both as a matter of good policy
and public perception.
A.

Public- and Investor-Owned Utilities

Some investor-owned utilities oppose net metering on the belief that small-scale production will cut into their revenues, and integrating numerous small systems will impose significant costs.
Other utilities have embraced net metering voluntarily, however,
due to benefits including cost avoidance of new power generation;
increases in the reliability of the grid; and infusion of power at peak
times when utility generation costs are highest. Net metering is an
easier sell to public utilities that do not aim to make a profit for
shareholders and, therefore, have less to lose if DRG nets less shortterm revenue.
Regulatory frameworks vary greatly among states. The general
practice of utility ratemaking consists of the utility presenting its
capital, operating, and maintenance costs and a set return on these
expenditures to the state PUC for approval. If IOUs do not recover
capital outlays through volume sales, they become "stranded costs"
for the IOUs, which cannot be recovered without raising rates or
fees. Changing an IOU's volume of sales between rate cases affects
its expected profit and shareholder returns. Thus, IOUs are particularly sensitive to policies, such as net metering or energy efficiency
programs, which could potentially decrease their sales volumes.
Even though decreasing volume may not in the long-run impose costs on the utility, in the short-run, consumer gains may come
from the utility's losses because the rates were set based on a projected volume that did not include the new policy change.
Ratemaking sets up a loose contract: X sales at Y price. Consumer
savings are the result of lower consumption, which slices into the
utilities' expected revenues. In states that allow this procedure,
IOUs are likely to request a "true-up" for lost volumes in between
rate cases, which would result in higher electric bills for non-DRG
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customers and reduced savings for DRG customers. At the next

ratemaking, the utility can revise and lower expectations for volume
sales, as well as account for the benefits of avoided costs of new
generation.1 13 In the end, all costs are variable.
Although electric utilities' revenues have decreased since the
recent recession began, costs have also sharply declined. Capacity
margins have eased and utilities have avoided pricey peak demand
as electricity sales volumes have dipped. In addition, power plant
construction costs have fallen.1 14 Despite utilities' concerns, most
electric utilities have opted for relatively few rate cases since the

recession hit, indicating that a full accounting may not reflect the
losses that industry trade groups allegedly fear. Price adjustment
mechanisms, such as true-ups, rate cases, and numerous price adjustments triggered by changes in costs, remain at utilities' disposal

when they experience real losses. Overall industry statistics for
IOUs remain strikingly strong, however, with healthy profit margins
and reliable dividends even during the depressed economy and
lower volume sales in 2009.115
As noted earlier, forty-three states and D.C. employ net metering, and states have found various ways of addressing the challenges
presented by net metering. One successful adjustment has been to
ramp up DRG slowly, capping it at 1% until its effects are demonstrated in a particular market. As utilities incorporate DRG (and
renewable energy generally) into their generation and distribution
projections, DRG becomes an integrated part of doing business and
increasing generating capacity. Such has been the case in Ohio,
113. Some utilities and policymakers favor "revenue decoupling" as a solution
to volume reductions due to increased energy efficiency. States where decoupling
has been adopted, however, have generally seen rate increases, and most pilot programs are still under review. Under decoupling, ratepayers face the risk of being
charged twice: once for the cost of the utility's lost revenues and again for the cost
of installing DRG or improvements in efficiency that create the energy savings.
Ratemaking provides a more holistic view of avoided operating costs, fixed or sunk
costs, losses actually attributable to policy changes, and other savings, such as peak
load reduction and avoided costs of new plants.
114. Power Plant Construction Costs Fall, Index Shows, POwER-GEN WORLDWIDE
(June 23, 2009), http://www.powergenworldwide.com/index/display/article
00 9 0 6
/ /powerdisplay/365028/articles/power-engineering/industry-news-2/2
in
power plant condecrease
(citing
plant-construction-costs-fall-index-shows.html
struction costs).
115. See Henry Fund Research: Electric Utilities, U. OF IOWA SCH. OF MGMT., 1
(Feb. 10, 2010), http://tippie.uiowa.edu/henry/reports10/electric-utilities.pdf
(identifying index profit margin at 9.2% and dividend yield at 4.4%); see also Revenue and Expense Statistics for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, U.S. ENERGY
(last
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat8pl.html
visited Feb. 9, 2011) (identifying net operating revenues and sales for major
IOUs).
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New York, and California. As DRG makes up a significant percentage of generation, new problems may arise, but most states have not
reached this plateau.
Regardless of whether utility companies credit or reimburse
net excess generation at retail or wholesale rates, they will never
have to pay more for DRG than the price at which they would be
able to resell it to another customer. DRG will eventually become
just another source of generation, and a gentle ramp up will allow
IOUs time to integrate it into their generation planning. PURPA's
generous "avoided cost" formula to reimburse independent generators did not bankrupt utilities, and, indeed, made the generation
market more competitive. For non-integrated utilities in deregulated markets, cheaper generation can both improve utility revenues and deflate customer rates. If there is a national cap on
carbon emissions, future benefits of DRG for utilities will also include reducing the need to purchase carbon emission credits and
avoiding the additional costs of new power plants.
B.

Evaluating Costs and Benefits for Customers Who are Not
Customer-generators

Although customer-generators can reap large benefits from
net metering, there is a legitimate concern that some of their savings may be at the expense of other customers who do not generate
their own power. Because customer-generators still use the grid but
only pay for power in excess of their generation, all else being
equal, utility revenues will decrease unless rates are increased.
IOUs express concern that customer-generators who receive retailrate reimbursement for net generation are receiving more than
they put into the grid because customer-generators underpay for
the fixed costs associated with transmission and distribution.1 16 In
the summer of 2009, Xcel Energy asked Colorado to assess a new
fee on solar installations in order to compensate for solar customergenerators' avoidance of fixed costs; the proposal was met with
fierce opposition, to which Xcel relented.' 17 The external benefits
of DRG are nevertheless significant and can actually result in cus116. See Russell Gold, Meter Reader: Wading in the Controversial Net MeteringDebate, WALL ST. J. ENvrTL. CAP. BLOc (Aug. 20, 2009, 12:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/environmentalcapital/2009/08/20/meter-reader-wading-into-the-contro
versial-net-metering-debate/ (stating position of Edison Electric Institute).
117. Id. (describing downfall of Xcel Energy fee proposal for solar customer
generators).
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tomer-generators earning a personal benefit and subsidizing other
customers. "

In the case of solar customer-generators in particular, DRG
provides external benefits because it reduces peak demand; improves grid efficiency and reliability; avoids transmission and distribution grid capital investments; and avoids costly overcapacity of
unpredictable power generation needs." 9 If solar customer-generators were to store their excess power by using batteries instead of
the grid, other customers would be far worse off because power
would be stored during times of peak usage and then used during
off-peak hours. Distributed generation of geothermal and wind
power also defers transmission and distribution expansion and has
the potential to accommodate plug-in electric vehicles and other
new technologies that can use electricity during off-peak times.
Increasing DRG is cheaper for the utility than building a new
power plant because much of the costs for DRG are borne by customer-generators, and utilities can sell customer-generators' excess
power to other customers. If the utility is buying power from customer-generators in a low-rate state and selling it to a high-rate
state, the utility earns additional revenue from DRG customers,
which subsidizes non-generator customers in the service area. If
the utility can sell the power purchased from the customer-generator for at least the same price as it paid the customer-generator,
then the cost to the utility is (at most) the cost of transmission and
distribution. Segregating transmission and distribution costs from
per-kWh usage rates is a common tactic for utilities to protect
against unfairly burdening other customer classes that could result
from DRG. This accounting method requires proper oversight,
however, because utilities could abuse it to discourage DRG by overstating fixed or transmission costs and understating avoided costs.
If the theoretical concern that DRG will result in cost-shifting
among ratepayer classes comes to fruition, and net metering results
in real losses to customers who are not generators, then price adjustments can be made to discount customer-generated power.
This solution has not yet been, and is unlikely to become, necessary.
The best way to address this concern is to start with a low cap for
DRG, raise the cap over time, and provide universal access to DRG
through rent-to-own programs, community purchase programs,
118. Cook Testimony, supra note 66, at 2-3 (advocating external benefits of
DRG).
119. Id. (describing further benefits of DRG).
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and low- and no-interest financing, so that all ratepayers can benefit
from the savings from DRG.
VII.

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Actions for All Levels of Government: Federal, State, and
Local

Federal, state, and local governments should install DRG for
government facilities and buildings. DRG provides governments
with long-term financial benefits, long-range planning certainty,
and energy bill savings. Government procurement of DRG will also
serve to expand the commercial market for DRG, supplying additional support to DRG technologies. Federal, state, and local governments should offer incentives for customers to install DRG.
Local governments should also bundle renewable technology
purchases and insulation services to benefit their localities by making DRG more affordable for residents of their districts. SMUD's
rent-to-own solar program has been highly successful, and SMUD
and power co-ops have been able to offer very affordable home systems by using the power of buying in bulk to obtain a large discount
on equipment and installation.
B.

Actions for FERC

In light of revisions to PURPA under the Energy Policy Act of
2005, utilities have found it easier to discriminate against small cogenerators, such as CHP plants. Membership in a Regional Trans-

mission Organization (RTO) or Independent System Operator
(ISO) exempts utilities from mandatory purchase obligations under
PURPA.1 20 Utilities only earn a return on generation they build
themselves, so it is in their interest to favor their own generation
and reserve transmission capacity for their own future generation

instead of selling the capacity to competitors. FERC should
strengthen enforcement to prevent such discrimination.
Some state interconnection rules create barriers to small and
renewable generators, discouraging residential and business customers from generating their own power by creating extra costs and
administrative hassles.121 FERC should alter its Order No. 2006 interconnection rule requiring co-generators to prove "deliverability"

to load and, instead, adopt a minimum interconnection stan120. Kowalczyk Testimony, supra note 97, at 5 (recounting that membership
in RTO exempts utilities from mandatory purchase obligations).
121. Cook Testimony, supra note 66, at 9 (discussing need for uniformity
among FERC's rules).
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dard.122 If given new federal authority, FERC should institute a federal standard to smooth interconnection with DRG. Even without
new legislation, FERC could encourage the adoption of model
rules, such as those written by the IREC,12- that minimize barriers
to DRG development.' 2 4 Under such a scenario, states would still
be free to go beyond the minimum standards.
C. Actions for Congress
Congress should institute minimum federal standards for net
metering to set a floor of protection for customer-generators. Nondiscrimination, streamlined requirements, and "full credit" for all
kilowatt-hours produced would remove the hurdles some utilities
and states have placed before would-be customer-generators. Net
metering that uses non-monetary transactions to credit kilowatthours and does not reimburse the customer-generator for net excess generation is certainly more administratively efficient and
palatable to IOUs. However, customer-generators should not be
forced to give their net excess generation to the utility for free
when the utility resells the power at market rate. Revenue streams
to customer-generators for net excess generation are an important
incentive for DRG, and the federal government should require that
customer-generators receive just compensation for the excess
power they place on the grid. State PUCs can further delineate
"full credit" and "just compensation" on a utility-by-utility basis, but
Congress should mandate the standard that customer-generators
must receive at the maximum value for excess generation that does
not burden other customer classes.
Restricting QFs by size no longer makes sense given that technology has evolved to allow customers to become small producers
themselves and avoid capital transmission costs. Utilities are required to purchase power from QFs of larger than 40 kW (unless
the QFs have access to a competitive market under PURPA section
210(m), as amended), but Congress should amend this requirement to apply to smaller customer-generators as well. Compensation for customer-generators should be set at the "just
122. Kowalczyk Testimony, supra note 97, at 5 (advocating alteration of FERC
Order).
123. See, e.g., Model InterconnectionProcedures, 2009 Edition, INTERSTATE 0RENEWA9
BLE ENERGY COUNSEL (2009), http://irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2 0 /11/
IREC-IC-Model-Final-Nov-8-2009-1.pdf (promoting best practices and important
advances in interconnection procedures).
124. Cook Testimony, supra note 66, at 6 (highlighting importance of uniform FERC rules).
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compensation" standard outlined above to provide states and utilities some flexibility in price setting for micro-generation (i.e. generation under 40 kW). Renewable generation should be encouraged
at all levels for environmental, security, and price stability reasons.
The same rationale applies to both small customer-generators and
larger independent generators: competition in power generation
brings down prices. As is done in all states with net metering, customer-generators should be required to provide adequate notice to
the utility and follow interconnection rules so that utilities and local
distribution companies can prepare for additional flows to the grid
with minimal hassle and cost.
With the exception of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas,
transmission and distribution systems are connected across state
lines. As electricity grids and markets have modernized and become increasingly interstate, Congress should grant FERC more authority over what used to be isolated and purely regional markets.
Congress should also statutorily specify or delegate to FERC the authority to speed up timelines for interconnection approval, cap fees
for interconnection, standardize application and agreement forms,
and mandate minimum interconnection standards for IOUs, as
FERC already requires for public utilities under sections 202(b),
205, 206, and 210 of the FPA.125 States and PUCs should not allow
utilities to shut out generation competition from customergenerators.
One reason some states do not provide cash payment for net
excess generation may be because they want to avoid FERCjurisdiction and fees associated with cash payments to customer-generators.
Generators selling to the wholesale market must pay a tariff for interconnection under FERC jurisdiction, and customer-generators
avoid this tariff by giving the energy back to the utility instead of
receiving cash payment. Congress could easily exempt customergenerators under a certain size, however, if it chose to recognize
the benefits of DRG and a distinction between small-scale customergenerators and "merchant generators." In order to avoid FERCjurisdiction, some states also credit customers' net excess generation

125. SeeJason B. Keyes, Keyes & Fox LLP, Presentation before USEA/USAID
Workshop: Best Practices in Interconnection of Distributed Generation (Sept. 2,
2009), available at http://wvw.usea.org/programs/EUPP/GCRESeptember
2009/GCREPresentations/GCRWorkshopPresentationsWednesdaySeptem
ber-2-2009/IREC USEA-presentation-Sep-2-2009-Keyes.pdf (contemplating acceptable practices for interconnection); see also, Kelly Testimony, supra note 82, at
2.
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at the utility's unbundled generation rate.1 26 Other states, such as
New York and Ohio, already provide customer-generators with cash
refunds. Congress should exempt customer-generators from interconnection tariffs imposed on independent generators to remove
any legal gray area for net billing.
Federal interconnection standards minimize discrimination
against new generators, expedite the process for new generators,
and ensure safety and reliability.12 7 The FPA largely exempts local
distribution companies (LDCs) from FERC authority unless the
LDC also sells energy in the wholesale market. 128 While FERC has
tried to harmonize state and federal interconnection practices and
expressed its "hope" that states would model their interconnection
rules after the federal model, many states have not followed FERC's
lead. 129 Some states (or utilities, if state regulators are silent) have
instituted restrictive requirements such as additional insurance requirements; redundant external disconnection switches; unmanageable application forms; unreasonable limits on the size of
generator to be connected; high fees; long delays in approval; and
low payments or credits for excess power returned to the grid.13 0
The federal government should limit these abusive and anti-competitive practices and provide a fair playing field for DRG against
traditional sources and owners of electricity services.

126. See, e.g., FirstEnergy Corp. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 768 N.E.2d 648, 653
(Ohio 2002) (holding that customers who were net generators were not entitled to
credit from electric utility at unbundled generation rate). Initially, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio required utilities to credit customer net excess generation at the utility's full retail rate before the Ohio Supreme Court decided this
exchange was illegal. Id. at 651.
127. Kelly Testimony, supra note 82, at 4 (analyzing benefits from federal interconnection standards).
128. Id. at 4-5 (citing FERC Order No. 2006 and NARUC v. FERC, 475 F.2d
1299 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (generalizing about exemption of LDCs from FERC
authority).
129. See Brown Testimony, supra note 63, at 4 (discussing FERC's desire to
standardize interconnection rules); see also Kelly Testimony, supra note 82, at 5
(expressing FERC's attempt to harmonize state and federal interconnection practices); see also Freeing the Grid, supra note 96, at 93 (arguing for harmonization of
state practices).
130. See id. at 85 (detailing restrictive requirements instituted by states and
utilities).
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Actions for States
1. Provide DRG Extra Credit Towards Renewable Portfolio
Standards

Currently, states have the most authority to improve net metering policies, and many of them have made improvements in recent
years. States should encourage utilities to meet RPS by providing
extra credit for DRG within the RPS formula. In states with an RPS
or renewable electricity standard requirement, giving double credit
(or at least more than 100%) for DRG towards meeting the RPS
rewards utilities with a large supply of DRG in their service area.13 1
For example, Washington state gives double credit for DRG, and its
utilities offer generous incentives for DRG as a result. 132
Because of California's strong RPS requirement and solar incentives for utilities and customers, Southern California Edison
(SCE) provides a cash incentive per watt for installing electricitygenerating equipment under its self-generation incentive program.
The California Energy Commission's Renewable Energy Buydown
Program provides similar incentives for small, renewable self-generation units.1 33 In addition, SCE offers a solar incentive program
that pays a lump sum or monthly payment for installed solar systems based on expected generation. This subsidy resembles renting the customer's roof because the customer does not bear any
risk for the amount of energy his or her system produces, nor does
the customer benefit beyond the fixed payment agreed to by contract. While fixed payment contracts assure customer-generators a
set return on their investments, these contracts do not insulate customer-generators from future price spikes like maintaining ownership over the power they produce would. Providing customers a
choice of risk and return options enhances customer alternatives
and helps diversify the utility's portfolio.
Another incentive for utilities to, at least, stop fighting net metering would be to reward the utility for DRG even if it does not
build the capacity itself. For example, if a utility normally earns an
8% return on capital investments, state PUCs could decide it would
receive 2% for new expenditures on DRG within its service area.
This policy would incentivize utilities to encourage DRG and quan131. See Freeing the Grid, supra note 96, 94-99 (ranking state policies for net
metering and interconnection standards).
132. Id. (depicting variations in state DRG policies).
133. See Customer Generation, SOUTHERN CAL. EDISON, http://www.sce.com/
customergeneration/customer-generation.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011) (discussing benefits of California's energy policies).
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tify the costs and benefits to other customers. Any additional cost
from DRG is overwhelmed by the savings to other customers because the utility is only receiving a 2% return on increased capacity
instead of building new generation facilities and charging an additional 8% on top of that. If customer-generators produce 600 kW
of power, which preempts the need for a new power plant, other
customers save the cost of the power plant and the 8% profit margin, and instead only pay 2% of the capital investment made by
customer-generators in the service area. This arrangement equitably distributes benefits from DRG while encouraging customer-generators to install DRG. Alternatively, utilities could continue to
earn the expected rate of return for DRG that they assist in financing under a "borrowed" roof or amortized small-scale generator system. Creating opportunities for customer-generators and utilities
to act as partners in increasing DRG is important for utility buy-in.
2.

Customer-generatorCredits and Reimbursement for Net Excess
Generation

Net metering that credits consumers at a 1:1 ratio for energy

produced and credited is administratively pleasing and evenhanded. Reimbursement at more than 100% retail (e.g. avoided
marginal cost under PURPA) would still leave the utilities enough
breathing room to avoid rate hikes, but the 1:1 ratio is a fair compromise and easy to both understand and calculate. Tiered or realtime pricing can complicate even the 1:1 ratio, however. Solar
power is generated when demand is highest, and crediting solar
customer-generators at real-time prices would be an added incentive for solar power. Wind power, on the other hand, is most productive at night, when demand and corresponding prices are
lowest. Therefore, a crediting or reimbursement program relying
on real-time pricing would dramatically favor solar over wind for
DRG. Wind power has received more federal subsidies than solar
power in recent years, 134 so additional subsidies for solar may not
be a bad idea, but favoring one technology over another is generally undesirable.
Most net metering policies credit a customer's next bill if the
customer generates more power than he or she consumes, and,
when the customer's remaining credits are eliminated at the end of
134. See How Much Does the Federal Government Spend on Energy-specific Subsidies
and Support?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 8, 2008), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
energy-in.brief/energysubsidies.cfm (discussing federal government's favoritism
towards wind power).
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twelve months, the customer starts the next year with zero credits.135 Net billing, a policy under which customers would receive a
cash payment for excess generation accumulated after twelve
months, allows customers to earn a return beyond cutting their energy bills to zero. Net billing's administrative burden and financial
cost to utilities makes net billing an undesirable option for many
utilities. It is unfair, however, for utilities to usurp excess energy
from a customer-generator for free and then resell it to other customers at full retail rate. Transferring customer-generators' power
to the utility without compensation discriminates against customergenerators as opposed to independent generators. While customer-generators are presumably not "in the business" of selling
power to utility companies, this does not mean that they should be
forced to give away excess generation without compensation.
Clear state rules that provide fair reimbursement for net excess
generation are highly desirable for long-term investment planning
in DRG. Utilities should reimburse customer-generators for net excess generation at the end of the year through a net billing arrangement, and the minimum reimbursement rate should be the average
cost of electricity for the utility during that year. The average cost
option is still inferior to reimbursement at the retail rate, but each
PUC should analyze the rate structure of the individual utility to
determine a fair reimbursement price because utility purchasing arrangements vary widely. Most utilities buy electricity in long-term
contracts, not in the spot market, and average price is a well-understood parameter. Some utilities are more generous and reimburse
for net excess generation at the retail rate. Retail rates are transparent, easy to identify, and track a customer-generator's actual savings
from avoided purchases from the grid. After adequately accounting for avoided costs attributable to DRG, states should mandate
retail reimbursement where feasible and when it would not burden
other consumer classes.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If designed correctly, net metering policies can increase distributed renewable generation and provide a win for the environment, electricity customers, state and federal regulators, and
utilities. Reasonable reimbursement for net excess generation and
a streamlined interconnection process will improve residential,
commercial, and industrial investments in DRG. In return, ex135. Credits offset energy consumption, but do not offset fixed costs, such as
customer charges or other flat fees.
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panded DRG will avoid the costs of new transmission lines, power
plants, development of distant renewable resources, and line losses,
as well as empower electricity consumers to develop renewable energy on their own instead of waiting for it down the line.
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